This paper studies the quality of service (QoS) provision problem in noncooperative networks where applications or users are sel sh and routers implement generalized processor sharing based packet scheduling. We formulate a model of QoS provision in noncooperative networks where users are given the freedom to choose both the service classes and tra c volume allocated, and heterogenous QoS preferences are captured by a user's utility function. We present a comprehensive analysis of the noncooperative multi-class QoS provision game, giving a complete characterization of Nash equilibria and their existence criteria, and show under what conditions they are Pareto and system optimal. We show that, in general, Nash equilibria need not exist, and when they do exist, they need not be Pareto nor system optimal. For certain \resource-plentiful" systems, however, we show that the world indeed can be nice with Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima collapsing into a single class. We study the problem of facilitating e ective QoS in systems with multi-dimensional QoS vectors containing both mean-and burstiness-related QoS measures. We extend the game-theoretic analysis to multi-dimensional QoS vector games and show under what conditions the aforementioned results carry over.
Introduction

Background
With the increased deployment of high-speed local-and wide-area networks carrying a multitude of information from e-mail to bulk data to voice, audio, and video, provisioning adequate quality of service (QoS) to the diverse application base has become an important problem 3, 13, 27, 33] . This paper describes a QoS provision architecture suited for best-e ort environments, based on ideas from microeconomics and noncooperative game theory.
We construct a noncooperative multi-class QoS provision model where users are assumed to be sel sh, and packets are routed over switches where, as a function of their enscribed priority, di erentiated service is delivered. The diverse spectrum of application QoS requirements is modeled using utility functions. Users or applications 4 can choose both the service classes and the tra c volumes assigned to them. The interaction of users behaving sel shly in accordance with their QoS preferences leads to a noncooperative game whose dynamic properties we seek to understand.
The traditional approach to QoS provision uses resource reservations along a route to be followed by a tra c stream so that the stream's data rate and burstiness can be suitably accommodated. Although research abounds 8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 28, 33, 35, 36, 10] , analytic tools for computing QoS guarantees rely on shaping of input tra c to preserve well-behavedness across switches which implement some form of packet scheduling discipline such as generalized processor sharing (GPS), also known as weighted fair queueing 11, 35] . Real-time constraints of multimedia tra c and the scale-invariant burstiness associated with self-similar network trafc 29,39,48,37] limit the shapability of input tra c while at the same time reserving bandwidth that is signi cantly smaller than the peak transmission rate. Thus QoS and utilization stand in a trade-o relationship with each other 37] and transporting application tra c over reserved channels, in general, incurs a high cost.
This makes it important to organize today's best-e ort bandwidth, as exampli ed by the Internet, into strati ed services with graded QoS properties such that the QoS requirements of a compendium of applications can be e ectively met. This is particularly useful for applications that possess diverse but|to varying degrees| exible QoS requirements. It would be overkill to transport such tra c over reserved channels. On the other hand, relying on homogenous best-e ort service, characteristic of today's Internet, would be equally unsatisfactory. A dual architecture capable of supporing reserved and strati ed best-e ort service is needed which, in turn, helps amortize the cost of ine ciencies stemming from overprovisioned resources for guaranteed tra c through the lling-in e ect 25].
Recently, microeconomic/game-theoretic approaches to resource allocation have received signi cant interest with application domains spanning a number of di erent con-texts 7, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 30, 34, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46] . The overall goal of this area is to formulate a resource allocation problem in the framework of microeconomics and game theory, and show that under certain conditions, the system achieves \desirable" allocations from stabilibity, fairness, and optimality points-of-view. The latter are important in making strati ed best-e ort bandwidth practically usable by QoS-sensitive applications: predictable service, both in terms of dynamic stability and the rendering of appropriate QoS, are crucial prerequisites to feasibly realizing such an architecture.
The models and approaches proposed in the literature di er along several dimensions, some of the important ones being whether applications or users are assumed to be cooperative or sel sh, whether pricing is used or not, and how much computing responsibility is delegated to the user. Several papers have addressed the issue of multi-class QoS provision in highspeed networks 7, 22, 31, 42, 41, 38] . Some of the works employ a cooperative framework or place signi cant computing responsibilities on the part of the user 31, 41] , some investigate the e ect of pricing incentives 7] , and others represent ow/congestion control and routing models that only partially address the quality of service problem 22, 34, 42] .
Our approach di ers from previous works in two signi cant ways. First, we give a comprehensive noncooperative resource allocation model for multi-class QoS provision where users are endowed with heterogenous QoS preferences and make decisions based on sel sh user needs. Second, users are allowed to choose both the service classes and tra c volumes assigned to them at a router or switch and the properties associated with utility functions are derived from the networking context. The latter leads to non-concave utility functions and we analyze its impact on the resulting game structure.
Our model, although principally intended to model resource sharing and arbitration at a router|the building block of wide area networks|in the context of QoS provision, is more general in nature and can be applied to other settings including the delivery of packaged network services by an ISP (Internet Service Provider). Speci cally, assuming that a service provider exports a number of di erent services|platinum, gold, silver, bronze|to the user, it is generally the case that the more users subscribe to a particular service class the less the quality of service experienced in that class due to congestion e ects. The behavioral characteristics of such a system when users have heterogenous preferences and act sel shly to optimize individual utility falls within the framework of the model studied here.
Basic notations and modeling assumptions
Our results rely on a set of elementary assumptions which are described next. The formal network QoS provision game is de ned in Section 2. We are given n applications or users and m service classes where each user i 2 1 ; n] has a tra c demand given by its mean data rate i .
Each user can choose where and how much of its tra c to apportion to the m service classes given by its allocation vector i = ( i1 ; i2 ; : : : ; im ) T where ij 0 and P j ij = i .
The QoS achieved in service class j 2 1; m] is determined by a QoS function c j (e.g., packet loss rate), and c j is monotone in q j where q j = P i ij . The generalization to multi-dimensional QoS vectors is shown in Section 3.4. Each user is endowed with a utility function U i ( ij ; c j ) which indicates the satisfaction received by user i when sending volume ij of tra c receiving QoS level c j through service class j. We assume that U i is monotone in ij , c j .
The above assumptions are fairly natural given that all that we have said is that the QoS associated with a service class deteriorates when more tra c is pumped into it, users disapprove of bad service quality, and users don't mind sending more if the \cost" is the same. Two simple observations follow from the above. First, since c j is a function of the allocation vectors 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n , by function composition, U i is a function of the allocation vectors and the latter constitute the only independent variables. Second, by composition of monotone functions, U i remains monotone in ij . These implied facts will become relevant later.
Summary of new results
Before we state the results, three notions are of import to their understanding (de ned formally in Section 2.3): Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimum, and system optimum. Roughly speaking, a con guration is a Nash equilibrium if each player cannot improve its individual lot through unilateral actions a ecting its tra c allocations. Thus if every player nds herself in such a \local optimum," then from the noncooperative perspective, the system is at an impasse|i.e., stable rest point. A con guration is a Pareto optimum if in order to improve the lot of some player, the lot of others must be sacri ced. A con guration is system optimal if the sum of the individual lots is maximized. Nash equilibria and existence conditions We give a complete characterization of Nash equilibria and their existence conditions. We show that Nash equilibria need not exist and we show that this is attributable to the non-concave|in particular, quasi-concave 5 but not concave|nature of utility functions arising in the general networking context. For the special case of unsplittable games, however, where a user's tra c ow is prohibited from being split into separate sub ows going into di erent service classes, we show that Nash equilibria always exist.
Relationship to Pareto and system optimality We analyze the conditions under which Nash equilibria|if they exist|are Pareto and system optimal. The latter is shown to be related to the Pareto optimality of a certain normal form con guration derived from Nash equilibria. We also show that there are Nash equilibria that are Pareto but not system optimal, and that there exist Nash equilibria that are not Pareto optimal and vice versa.
Resource-plentiful systems We show that for certain \resource-plentiful" systems, Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optimal all conincide collapsing into a single class. This item is interesting from the perspective that it gives a su cient condition under which Nash equilibria are guaranteed to be desirable in the optimality sense. We also show that for resourceplentiful systems a certain self-optimization procedure leads to quick, robust convergence to globally optimal Nash equilibria.
Extension to multi-dimensional QoS vectors We extend the game-theoretic analysis to multi-dimensional QoS vector games containing s 1 di erent QoS measures. The monotonicity assumptions described in Section 1.2 are generalized to the s-dimensional QoS vector case. We show that the main results carry over if a uniformity assumption is placed either on application preference or on QoS vector functions.
Related work
Microeconomic approaches to resource allocation In recent years, there has been a surge of work in \microeconomic approaches to resource allocation" where ideas and tools from microeconomics and game theory have been applied in the formulation and solution of problems arising in ow control, routing, le allocation, load balancing, multi-commodity ow, and quality of service provision, among others 15 Many of the earlier papers, including some recent ones 16, 15, 26, 31, 41] , have espoused a cooperative game theory framework to model user interactions and derive results based on Pareto optimality. Although fruitful to investigate due to the powerful tools available in cooperative game theory, a potential drawback of this approach is the assumption that users or applications behave cooperatively in networking contexts. For the long-term establishment of virtual circuits or the leasing of telephone lines, the cooperative user model may indeed be viable 6 . However, for best-e ort applications that comprise much of today's Internet tra c, users are largely anonymous with respect to thousands of other users who concurrently share network resources at any given time, and a noncooperative framework where each user is assumed to optimize individual performance based on his or her limited available information about the network state is better suited.
The noncooperative framework can be traced as far back as '81 to a paper by Yemini 49] who has since been more strongly associated with the cooperative approach. The noncooperative network resource allocation approach has been actively pursued by Lazar and his co-workers beginning in the late '80s 20,2] with more recent work carried out jointly with Korilis and Orda 21{24, 34] . Their main work has revolved around an optimal ow control problem, and the development of techniques needed to show the existence of Nash equilibria 22]. Korilis et al. 23, 24] have also looked at the problem of using interventions by an impartial external entity|the network manager|to steer a system toward Nash equilibria that are system optimal. Of special interest is Orda et al.'s work on routing games 34] which is intimately related to the multi-class QoS provision model studied in this paper. This is further explicated below.
Another signi cant thrust in noncooperative network games is due to recent work by Shenker 42] where it is shown how choosing a packet scheduling discipline can in uence the nature of the Nash equilibria attained. In the context of a congestion control model, it is shown that for a large class of packet scheduling disciplines, a con guration being Nash need not imply that it is Pareto optimal. A packet scheduling discipline called Fair Share is described and it is shown to lead to Nash equilibria with desirable properties including uniqueness and reachability by a class of self-optimization procedures. . In both approaches, it is assumed that QoS guarantees are computable, given speci c resource reservations. As stated earlier, an important goal of our approach is to shield the user from having to make complex computations to estimate service quality.
In 7], a general framework for investigating pricing in networks is proposed with service discipline and pricing policy acting as design variables. Simulation results are shown that depict the existence of \desirable" price ranges related to system optimality. The simulations were carried out using a 2-service class packet scheduling algorithm where a shared FIFO queue was partitioned into two segments with high priority packets being queued at the front and low priority packets being queued at the back. Four types of applications with di erent QoS requirements were tested with priority settings set either to 1 or 2.
Comparison with congestion control models by Korilis et erative routing game where a set of users with xed throughput demands have a choice of assigning their ow to a set of parallel links or routes. Although motivated by di erent contexts, assuming independence between the parallel links|i.e., the performance characteristics (e.g., queueing delay) on some link or route depends only on the aggregate tra c volume assigned to it|a 1-1 correspondence can be established between Orda et al.'s routing model and the QoS provision model studied here.
Phrased in our language, the set of parallel links correspond to the service classes j 2 1; m], and a user i's average throughput demand i is assigned to the m routes given by the assignment vector i = ( i1 ; i2 ; : : : ; im ). Orda et al. then de ne a cost function J i j which corresponds to our utility function U i ( ij ; c j ). Both depend on the player i as well as the service class (or route) j. Since J i j is interpreted as a cost function, their's is a minimization problem. Orda et al. study the routing game under three successively more restrictive assumptions on the cost function J i j (called type-A, type-B, and type-C). In type-B and type-C, the cost function J i j takes on the form ij c j (q j ) thus losing its dependence on i except for the weighting term ij . As is formally de ned in Section 2.3, in our QoS provision game, the utility function has the form ij U i (c j (q j )); thus the utility's dependence on heterogenous user preferences is preserved.
Hence the results proved in 34] for type-B and type-C functions correspond to a population of users with homogenous preferences, and thus do not carry over to the more general QoS provision game studied here.
As for type-A games where dependence on individual preferences is preserved, the assumption is made that J i j is convex (concave in our context) in ij . However, as has been explicated in Section 1.2, the two monotonicity assumptions|c j is increasing in q j and U i is decreasing in c j |which are basic postulates applicable to most networking contexts of interest, are incompatible with the assumption that J i j is convex is ij . In fact, a simple consequence of the monotonicity assumption is that J i j is quasi-convex in ij . This is so since the composition of the two monotone functions again relates U i monotonically (decreasing) to ij , and monotone functions are trivially quasi-convex. Convexity and quasi-convexity, in the QoS provision context, however, can lead to di erent consequences.
Many-switch systems In 4, 5] , we describe an architecture for noncooperative multi-class QoS provision in many-switch systems 7 or wide area networks. Motivated by the analytical results and insights of this paper, we use the single-switch model as a building block in constructing a scalable architecture for multi-class QoS provision in WAN environments. We solve the end-to-end QoS provision problem in many-switch systems and the inter-switch couplings they introduce using distributed control that shields the user from complex computations while preserving the basic premise of sel shness. We show that the network system is able to provide predictable, strati ed service without resource reservation and is adaptive under stationary and nonstationary changes to network state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the overall set-up and formulate the network QoS provision model. Section 2.3 discusses the di erences between our model and the model of Orda et al. 34] , and the impact of heterogenous preferences in bringing about non-concave utilities. This is followed by Section 3 which gives a game-theoretic analysis of the QoS provision game structure. Section 3.3 discusses the resource-plentiful case and Section 3.4 extends the game-theoretic analysis to multi-dimensional QoS vectors. The proofs of our results are contained in a separate Appendix for the reader's reference. We conclude with a discussion of our results and future work.
Noncooperative network QoS provision game 2.1 Network model
The network model is depicted in Figure 5 .1. A switch or router is shared by two tra c classes|reserved and nonreserved (or best-e ort)|where the former constitutes background or cross tra c and the latter is the aggregate application tra c. That is, NR = P n i=1 i where 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n are the mean arrival rates of n application tra c sources. The service rate of the system is given by and we will assume that the switch implements a form of GPS packet scheduling with service weights 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; m where j 0, j 2 1; m], and P m j=1 j = 1.
Here, m denotes the number of service classes. The total service rate is split between the two tra c classes = R + NR . Service class j of the nonreserved tra c class thus receives a service rate of j NR . In keeping with the ATM framework, we assume xed-size packets (i.e., cells) and we employ output-bu ered switches. We implement a generic form of weighted fair queueing achieving perfect isolatedness and conservation of work. The latter come into e ect when performing simulations. We ignore e cient implementation considerations of WFQ, treating the processing cost at switches as xed. The assumption of xed-size packets simpli es the faithful rendering of service rates commensurate with the weights 1 ; : : : ; m .
Application model
Utility function Given a generic network model where packets are tagged by priority labels receiving di erentiated service at switches, we need a framework and control mechanism which is able to exploit this feature to provide service to applications with diverse QoS needs such that the collective good of the whole system is maximized. A utility function is a map U : R s ! R + , s 1, from QoS vectors to the nonnegative reals indicating the level of satisfaction or utility a certain quality of service brings to an application or user. It is a purely theoretical tool to reason about application behavior assuming certain qualitative shapes about its preferences. Figure 5 .2 shows two candidate utility functions, on the left, for \nonurgent" e-mail, and on the right, for a real-time video application. The packet loss rates have been exaggerated for illustrative purposes.
The shapes of the utility functions indicate that non-urgent e-mail is much more tolerant to high packet loss, and unless the loss rate is \exceedingly" high, the e-mail application is almost equally satis ed whether the loss rate is 0 or somewhat higher. The video application, on the other hand, can only tolerate much smaller loss rates, and its utility is concentrated toward 0.
Sel shness Sel shness, in our context, will mean that each application i 2 1; n] will try to take actions so as to maximize its individual utility U i . The forms for U i as well as user i's decision variables for the multi-class QoS provision problem are de ned in the next section. 
De nition of network QoS provision game
QoS provision problem Assume we are given m service classes and n applications or players represented by their mean arrival rates 1 ; : : : ; n and utility functions U 1 ; : : : ; U n . We arrive at a resource allocation problem in the following way. Let ij 0, i 2 1; n], j 2 1; m], denote the tra c volume of the i'th application assigned to service class j. Thus, i = P m j=1 ij . That is, application i is given the freedom to choose which service classes to assign her tra c to and how much. We also consider the special case when tra c assignments are restricted to be \all in one bag," i.e., ij 2 f i ; 0g, for all j 2 1; m]. Let = ( ij : i; j) denote the resource assignment matrix, and let c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : ; c m be the packet loss rates of the m service classes. Each packet loss rate is a function of , c j = c j ( ); j 2 1; m]: Assuming isolatedness (cf. Section 1.2), we have c j = c j (q j ) where q j = P n i=1 ij is the total tra c volume assigned to class j. This relation is only approximate for work conserving switches. The precise modeling of nonlinearities arising from work conservation, although interesting in its own right, is a general issue not speci c to our context, and we will ignore its e ect in this paper.
We will also make the assumption that c j is monotone in q j , i.e., dc j =dq j 0, a property satis ed by virtually all service disciplines of interest 8 . We will also assume that dU i =dc 0. That is, making the packet loss rate smaller 9 can never decrease the utility experienced by player i.
The model can be extended to the case when application QoS requirements are represented by multi-dimensional QoS vectors x 2 R s , s 1. For example, in addition to packet loss rate, x may specify delay requirements as well as restrictions on their uctuations such as jitter. 8 We sometimes use continuous notation for expositional purposes. Our results do not depend on c j and U i being smooth. 9 An analogous assumption is made in the multi-dimensional QoS vector case (Section 3.4).
It turns out that the analysis of the multi-dimensional case reduces to the scalar case under certain conditions, and we will proceed with packet loss rate c as the sole QoS indicator.
The weighted utility of application i, given assignment , is de ned as
Note that the utility function used in Section 1.2, U i ( ij ; c j ), corresponds to ij U i (c j ). Subject to the above constraints, the static optimization problem can be formulated as
This is a nonlinear programming problem with equality constraints.
Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima Any that satis es (2.1) is called system optimal. Thus system optimality corresponds to optimizing the usual resource allocation objective function. An assignment is Pareto optimal if for all ,
That is, Pareto optimality states that total utility U can only be improved at the expense of one or more individual utility U i . In general, Pareto optimality does not imply system optimality. But, clearly, being system optimal implies is Pareto optimal.
The formulation of Nash equilibrium needs a further de nition. Given , let i = ( i1 ; i2 ; : : : ; im ) denote the i'th player's assignment vector. i is also called the strategy of player i. Let L i ( ) = f 0 : 0 k = k ; k 6 = i; and k 0 i k 1 = i g where kxk 1 = P m j=1 jx j j. That is, L i ( ) is the set of all unilateral strategies for player i. An assignment is a Nash equilibrium if 8i 2 1; 
That is, in a Nash equilibrium, player i cannot improve its individual utility U i by unilaterally changing its strategy.
In general, a system optimal assignment need not be a Nash equilibrium and little can be said about the relation between system optimality, Pareto optimality, and Nash equilibria. In the context of the noncooperative network environment where every player acts sel shly, we are interested in characterizing assignments that are Nash since they represent stable xed points of the system|i.e., equilibria. From a resource allocation perspective, we would also like to know under what conditions Nash equilibria are Pareto and system optimal.
Simplifying assumption To make the analysis tractable, we will work with (unit) step utility functions where for each player i 2 1; n], U i (c) = With a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write U i (q j ) for the composite function when the distinction is clear from the context.
Non-concave utilities The simpli cation is reasonable from two perspectives. First, from the technical side, we do not lose very much by sacri cing continuity of the utility function since Lemma 3.5|which shows the existence of 2-application/2-service class games with no Nash equilibria|can be shown to hold even when U i is continuous and quasi-concave (but not concave) in each ij . This also holds for Theorem 3.6 which generalizes Lemma 3.5 to n-application/m-service class games. The crucial factor in proving non-existence is the quasiconcavity property which allows U i to be concave and convex over local segments and thus produce \holes" when forming convex combinations. In particular, even though U i is quasiconcave in each ij , U i = P j ij U i need not be quasi-concave.
Second, threshold or step utility functions have been implicitly applied in practical and analytical settings to model and encode/convey QoS preferences. For example, hard real-time systems, as de ned in the real-time systems literature, have this \all or nothing" property. Furthermore, irrespective of whether the user of an application possesses a step utility preference or not, when interacting with a network system through an application, the user must ultimately code and convey her preference to the underlying system. Bounds on packet loss rate, delay, jitter, and other QoS measures have been used to encode application tra c QoS requirements in di erent contexts including ones where they are used to compute resource reservations and in some commercial applications 32].
3 Properties of noncooperative QoS provision game
Nash equilibria and existence conditions
This section investigates the structure of Nash equilibria giving a complete characterization of Nash equilibria in the noncooperative multi-class QoS provision game as well as their existence conditions. First, let us impose a total order on the n players given by i i 0 () i i 0:
Unless otherwise stated, we will assume such a xed order in the rest of the paper. Following is a simple but often used fact on the induced ordering of the tra c volume thresholds b ij . It is a consequence of the total ordering of i and the monotonicity of c j . The two propositions are used in the proof of the following theorem which gives a complete characterization of Nash equilibria. The next lemma gives a simple su ciency condition for 2-application/2-service class games in which Nash equilibria do not exist. Then, for such choices of i , b ij , no Nash equilibrium exists.
Games satisfying the above conditions are easy to construct, and the reason that there are no Nash equilibria is because the game leads to a limit cycle. This type of behavior has also been observed in simulation studies. Next we generalize the \Nash Non-Existence condition" to n-application/m-service class games. The proof of Theorem 3.6 can be reduced to Lemma 3.5 and is a straightforward consequence. Whereas Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.6 constituted simple, easily constructable conditions for Nash non-existence, the next theorem gives a complete characterization of n-application/mservice class games for which Nash equilibria do exist.
Theorem 3.7 (Nash existence) Consider a n-application/m-service class game where the ordering implied by Proposition 3.1 is strict. Then a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if at least one of the following holds:
(a) Each player is \domitable;" i.e., 8i, P The above characterization has several interesting features. First, the theorem states that if any Nash equilibrium exists at all, then, in fact, a Nash equilibrium exists (possibly di erent) satisfying conditions that are much more restrictive than those of Theorem 3.4. Second, removing the existential quanti er in part (b) of the theorem is not possible 10 without replacing it by another existential quanti er of similar scope. This is due to the fact that the problem of checking if a Nash equilibrium exists|given the parameters of a game|is NP-complete 11 .
The proof of hardness relies on the hardness of checking whether there is a con guration satisfying constraint (b) in the theorem. The latter, in turn, is proved using a reduction from minimum cost multicommodity network ow with step cost functions.
The relevance of these remarks is that, even though it is possible to completely characterize QoS provision games for which a Nash equilibrium exists, it is not possible to give an e ective characterization in the sense of feasible computability. Thus control algorithms, even if privy to information about the network state, cannot, in general, accurately determine whether a network system with given resources and user demands is prone to instability in the Nash sense.
Let us consider a retricted QoS provision game where each user must channel his entire tra c into a single service class. That is, tra c is unsplittable. When viewed in the routing context, this would correspond to a circuit-switched system where a connection, once assigned a route, must follow the path during the entire lifetime of the connection. In our model, this corresponds to placing the further restriction that ij 2 f0; i g for all users i and service classes j.
Interestingly, for this restricted game, we can show that a Nash equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 3.8 (unsplittable games) Any unsplittable game has a Nash equilibrium.
Relating back to the issue of concavity and Nash existence, for unsplittable games, the problem of having to consider function values over convex combinations when utility is quasi-concave does not arise since the domain is discrete. Existence, however, does not mean that a Nash equilibrium is always reached starting from any initial con guration. In Section 3.3, Theo-rem 3.15, we show that for certain \resource-plentiful" systems, there is robust convergence to Nash equilibria from any initial state.
Relationship to Pareto and system optimality
In this section, we characterize the relationship between Nash equilibria, Pareto optimal, and system optima for the multi-class QoS provision game. First, we state a useful lemma that can be used to relate Pareto optimality of a con guration to system optimality.
For a con guration , an equivalent assignment 0 can be found with the same total utility so that the players are partitioned into two sets around a unique, dividing player i 0. The rst set consists of players with indices larger than i 0 with respect to the ordering induced by Proposition 3.1, with all players having full utility. The second set consists of players with smaller indices than i 0, all of them having zero utility. The third set is the singleton set fi 0g consisting of the dividing player who has partial utility. We will call such an assignment 0 a normal form of . Lemma 3.9 (normal form) Let be a con guration with U( ) < P n i=1 i . Let i maxfi : U i ( ) < i g. Then The usefulness of the normal form of a con guration (including Nash) comes into play when checking for system optimality of a Nash assignment. This is so since, as we shall see, it is su cient to check Pareto optimality of the normal form to establish system optimality of the original con guration. Moreover, a normal form is easy to obtain from the original Nash con guration (construction in the proof of Lemma 3.9) and checking for Pareto optimality is generally easier than checking for system optimality. Theorem 3.10 (Pareto & system optimal) Given a con guration , let 0 be its normal form. Then is system optimal i 0 is Pareto optimal.
An immediate corollary of the theorem is that a Nash equilibrium is system optimal i its normal form is Pareto optimal. Although Theorem 3.10 gives an interesting relationship between Pareto optimality and system optimality and is useful for reasoning about Nash equilibria in other contexts, it falls short of further exploiting potential structure speci c to Nash equilibria.
It is an open question whether there is some \independence" relation between Nash equilibria and system optima for the general multi-class QoS provision game.
Given the form of Theorem 3.10, one may wonder whether all assignments that are Nash and Pareto optimal are also system optimal. The next result gives a counterexample which shows that Theorem 3.10 is \tight" in the sense that, when conditioned with Nash equilibria, there are assignments that are both Nash and Pareto but not system optimal. Proposition 3.11 There exist Nash equilibria that are Pareto optimal but not system optimal.
Next, we characterize those Nash equilibria that are Pareto optimal. First, consider a modi ed game, parameterized by some assignment , de ned as follows. The thresholds for the players remain the same as in the original game. However, for each player i, the mean arrival rates are taken to be i U i ( ). Moreover, there is an additional player 0 whose thresholds b 0j are all 0, but whose tra c demand is 0 = P i i ? P i i . Note that the con gurations 0 in the original game for which 8i : U i ( 0 ) U i ( ) correspond (many-to-one) to system optimal con gurations M for the modi ed game. Let i j := min i6 =0 f ij > 0g: Theorem 3.12 (Nash-Pareto characterization) Let be a Nash equilibrium and let i be the player such that 8i > i , U i ( ) = i ; i.e., i is the largest player with incomplete utility. Note that in part (c) of Theorem 3.12, an even stronger statement is true: Consider the directed graph G whose vertices are the players i > i and whose edges are de ned as follows. An edge (i 1 ; i 2 ) exists in G if and only if fj : i 1 j > 0; i 2 j > 0g 6 = ; or 9 j 1 ; j 2 with i 1 j 1 > 0, i 2 j 2 > 0, and q j 2 b i 1 j 2 . Then there is no path from any vertex in S 2 to any vertex in S 1 in the graph G. In other words, for all players i > i , there is a path from S 2 to i, or from i to S 1 , or neither, but not both.
There are several interesting points to note in the above characterization. First, parts (a) and (b) depend on the combination of facts that is both Nash and Pareto. Parts (c) and (d), however, depend only on the fact that is Pareto. Second, removing the universal quanti er in (d) (\For any con guration M : : : ") is impossible for reasons similar to removing the existential quanti er in the statement of Theorem 3.7. The problem of deciding whether a con guration is not Pareto is NP-complete as long as the thresholds of each player are allowed to vary arbitrarily across the classes. Third, the optimization problems that correspond to the above decision problems possess convex feasible regions but the objective functions are highly nonlinear and even discontinuous.
On the other hand, the feasible region can be naturally partitioned into convex subregions over each of which the objective function is, in fact, linear. In each such region, the tra c volume q j of each class lies between an adjacent pair of threshold values b i j j and b i j +1j . The properties (a) to (c) in the above theorem, and, in fact, most of the structural results in this paper, rely on the behavior of objective functions whose level sets are convex within the subregions where they are linear. However, the level sets of these objective functions are nonconvex and consist of an intractably large number of disconnected components once we move outside the boundaries of these subregions. Therefore, searches for optima across boundaries of these subregions rapidly result in combinatorial explosion. The monotonicity properties of Proposition 3.1 do not seem to control this explosion.
In general, a simple consequence of the above discussion is that many Nash equilibria exist which are not Pareto optimal. In fact, the normal form of a Nash assignment obtained from the construction in the proof of Lemma 3.9 is typically itself Nash, and can be used to exhibit assignments that are Nash but not Pareto optimal. Thus, in general, gaps exist in all the important relations between con gurations that are Nash equilibria, Pareto optimal, or system optimal.
Resource-plentiful systems and dynamical behavior
In this section, we show that for certain \resource-plentiful" systems Nash equilibria always exist, and furthermore, they are always Pareto and system optimal. We also show that starting from any initial con guration robust convergence to a Nash equilibrium is achieved.
We de ne a dynamic game via the dynamic update process P as follows. We assume that the players move asynchronously, and at each step t, a single player i t unilaterally and sel shly reassigns its it so that the new assignment t maximizes its individual utility U it ( ). We further assume that no player moves unnecessarily|i.e., a player only makes changes to its assignment if it thereby strictly increases its individual utility. Moreover, for each user i there is an in nite sequence of time steps t i 1 < t i 2 < where i is allowed to perform an update (including a \no move" update). Then is a Nash equilibrium if and only if is a system optimum if and only if is a Pareto optimum. Moreover the optimum value achieved is U( ) = P j q j = P i i .
First, note that = P j q j . Resource plentifulness manifests itself via P m j=1 b ij . Since b ij = c ?1 j ( i ) where c j is the packet loss function and i is user i's utility threshold (cf. Proposition 3.1), the more resources there are available in the system (e.g., bandwidth), the less pronounced c j will be and the larger b ij (keeping i xed). Condition (3.14) then states that there are su cient resources available to potentially accommodate each user's requirements, and Theorem 3.13 shows that this is indeed the case even when users are sel sh. The next theorem shows that such desirable con gurations can be realized in a noncooperative manner starting from any initial con guration. Theorem 3.15 (convergence) Assume the supposition of Theorem 3.13 holds. Then, starting from any initial con guration 0 , the dynamic update process P converges to a Nash equilibrium . Moreover, is attained as soon as the sequence of players (i.e., moves) in the process P includes the subsequence n; n ? 1; : : : ; 1.
Extension of game-theoretic analysis to multi-dimensional QoS vectors
In Section 2, we formulated a noncooperative QoS provision game based on singleton QoS vectors, x = (c), where c was a bound on packet loss rate. Here, we will extend the model to multi-dimensional QoS vectors x 2 R s , s 1, and show that the singleton vector analysis carries over unchanged. Let x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x s ) T , and let x j = (x j 1 ; x j 2 ; : : : ; x j s ) T denote the quality of service rendered to service class j 2 1; m]. As before, we make the monotonicity assumption dx j r =dq j 0, r 2 1 In order to deal with the multi-dimensional QoS vectors and thresholds uniformly, we henceforth make one of two uniformity assumptions: either assume that the thresholds i r can be ordered such that the ordering is uniform over r, i.e., 8r 2 1; s]; 8i 2 1; n] : i r i+1 r ; (3.16) or we assume that the functional forms x j r are uniform over r for each j, i.e., The proof structure of our game-theoretic results rely on Proposition 3.1 to order application QoS preferences. The QoS vectors (i.e., scalar packet loss indicator) and their functions a ect the proof only through Proposition 3.1. Thus, under either of the uniformity assumptions, and with Proposition 3.19 in hand, it is straightforward to check that the proofs carry over unchanged giving Proposition 3.20.
Conclusion
We have presented a study of the quality of service provision problem in noncooperative multiclass network environments where applications or users are assumed to be sel sh. Users are endowed with heterogenous QoS preferences, and they are allowed to choose both where and how much of their tra c to send. Our framework and its conclusions are best suited|but not exclusively so|for best-e ort tra c environments where the network is not required to provide stringent QoS guarantees which can only be accomplished, currently, by employing conservative resource reservations. Rather, service classes with di erentiated QoS levels matching the needs of constituent applications are induced by the latter's sel sh interactions, providing reasonably stable and predictable QoS levels as a function of network state.
We have formulated a noncooperative multi-class QoS provision model and given a comprehensive analysis of its properties. We have shown that Nash equilibria|which correspond to stable xed points in noncooperative games|need not be Pareto nor system optimal; in fact, Nash equilibria need not even exist. We have given a complete characterization of Nash equilibria and their existence conditions, and we have studied the game-theoretic structure relating Nash equilibria to Pareto optima and system optima. In general, gaps exist between the classes at all levels, producing a picture of the world that is nontrivial and complex. Much of this is due to the presence of applications with diverse QoS requirements, the fact that they are allowed to choose where to send their tra c, and the basic axioms underlying network systems. For \resource-plentiful" systems, however, we have shown that Nash, Pareto, and system optima all coincide, and moreover, convergence is monotone and fast if a form of asynchronous selfoptimization is used. We have extended the analysis to systems with multi-dimensional QoS vectors containing both mean-and variance-related QoS measures. We have shown that the game-theoretic results carry over if a uniformity assumption is placed either on application preference thresholds or on QoS vector functions.
Many interesting and challenging problems remain, some of a mostly technical nature, and others motivated by performance evaluation and practical issues arising out of implementationrelated considerations. Current work is directed in two main avenues, one, in the extension of the game-theoretic analysis to arbitrary monotone utility functions and the incorporation of pricing which requires further development of analytical tools and techniques, and two, in the study of many-switch systems|a prime target being the realization of such QoS provision architectures in wide area network environments including the Internet. In the latter, the interaction among switches or routers introduces couplings that give rise to new complexities and a slew of challenging distributed control problems. An architecture for noncooperative multi-class QoS provision in many-switch systems and its properties can be found in 4, 5] . 43 Proof of Lemma 3.5. To the contrary, assume is a Nash equilibrium for the example described in the proposition. Due to the rst inequality satis ed by the i 's and the b ij 's, it follows that there is a service class j 1 for which 2j 1 = q 1 j 1 < b 1j 1 . Using this observation and applying the Nash characterization from Theorem 3.4 to the player 1, we obtain (without loss of generality, by the choice of j 1 Proof of Theorem 3.7. ((). First notice that (a) implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This follows by observing that since each player is domitable|i.e., the n equations P i 0 6 =i i 0 + P j b ij + a i ; are satis ed (the a i act as positive slack constants)|one can always nd a con guration where each player is dominated in each class. In other words, there is a choice of the 2nm assignment variables ij and slack variables s ij which will satisfy the nm constraints: 8i 8j P i 0 6 =i i 0 j = b ij + s ij (which is straightforward), which in addition satisfy the 2n constraints: 8i P j ij = i and 8i P j s ij = a i . Next, notice that (b) implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium because, if satis es the conditions in (b), then each of the players satis es one of the three conditions of Theorem 3.4. ()). Now we show that the negations of (a) and (b) together imply that every con guration is not Nash. The negation of (a) implies that for each con guration , some player is not dominated in some class. This, together with the negation of (b) implies that for each con guration there is a smallest player i which is not dominated in some class, and either there is a player i > i which does not have complete utility in or none of the three Nash conditions holds for the player i . In the latter case, clearly is not Nash. In the former case (assuming one of the three Nash conditions holds for the player i ), it follows that there is some class j where q j b i j . However, since some player i > i does not have full utility in , in order for to be Nash, q j b ij > b i j must hold for every class j due to the strict ordering of thresholds imposed by the statement of the Theorem. Hence it follows that is not Nash.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Let m be the number of service classes. If m = 1, then we are done. Assume m 2. Designate one of the service classes, say 1, as a special service class called the dumping ground. Consider the constructive process which starts out with the empty assignment and proceeds to assign the tra c of the n players in descending order n; n?1; : : : ; 1 starting with player n. At step k (k 2 1; n]), we assign the tra c of player n ? k + 1, n?k+1 , to some service class j 2 2; m] if player n ? k + 1 attains full utility in j. By Proposition 3.1 and the descending order of assignment, we are assured that a player already assigned to j will continue to achieve full utility. If no such service class exists, player n ? k + 1 is assigned to service class 1. By construction, it follows that the con guration reached is Nash. To achieve (a), we will distribute the excess utility into service classes j with q j > b i j thus nullifying their contribution. To avoid otherwise disturbing the utility assignment, we will move a commensurate amount from , exactly lling the gap left by . That is, q 0 j = q j , j 2 1; m], in the modi ed assignment 0 . If > , the reassignment can be achieved in one round. If , a re ned construction is used that iteratively shrinks the violating player set S i until it becomes empty. Following is a formal description of the construction. Proof of Theorem 3.10. Let 0 be the normal form constructed in the proof of Lemma 3.9.
Proofs of
We will prove the following statement from which the theorem follows immediately: 0 is not system optimal i there is a with U( ) > U( 0 ) such that which leads to a contradiction due to the threshold ordering implied by Proposition 3.1. Let = minf i ? j ? ; i + j + g. We can move an amount of i ? 's assignment from j ? to j + , and an equal amount of i + 's assignment from j + to j ? . By Proposition 3.1, player i + 's utility strictly increases by whereas player i ? 's utility strictly decreases by the same amount. The other players' utilities remain undisturbed since the total volume assignment to each service class was held invariant. Proof of Proposition 3.11. The following describes a counter example consisting of a system of 3 players and 3 service classes and an assignment which is Nash and Pareto but not system optimal. As usual, using This assignment is clearly a Nash equilibrium: 22 = 2 is unutilized, but player 2 cannot unilaterally reassign its share to improve its utility. Players 1 and 3 have full utility. Hence the total utility for assignment is 3 + 1 . This assignment , however, is not system optimal. The total utility can be increased using the following changes to the assignment: the quantity 1 can be moved to service class 2 from service class 1 so that the new 11 is now 0, but the new 21 is now equal to 1 . A part of 2 equivalent to the quantity 1 + 1 is moved into service class 3 so that service class 2 now has total volume q 2 that is one less than its previous value. Therefore 2 is now partitioned into 23 = 1 + 1, with the remainder of 2 assigned to 23 while 21 remains 0. Finally, a part of 3 equivalent to the quantity 1 + 1 is moved to service class 1 so the volume of service class 1 increases overall by 1 unit, and service class 3 retains the same volume as before. Now 3 is partitioned into 31 = 1 + 1, with the remainder of 3 assigned to 33 while 32 remains 0. The utility of player 3 remains the same as before, i.e., it has full utility 3 . The utility of player 1 has decreased from 1 to 0 and the utility of player 2 has increased from 0 to 1 + 1. Hence the total utility after completion of the above reassignment is 1 + 3 + 1 and hence it has increased by 1 overall which shows that the assignment is not system optimal. It is not hard to see that is, in fact, Pareto optimal; i.e., for any assignment 0 that has higher total utility, there must be at least one player, in particular, player 1, whose individual utility in 0 is less than that in .
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Before we give the proof, we rst de ne a concept that is used often. A k-ip is a map from one con guration to another 0 , denoted by a sequence (i 1 ; j 1 ; i 2 ; j 2 ; : : : ; i k ; j k ) with minf i 1 ;j 1 ; : : : ; i k ;j k g = > 0 called the ip value. The map is de ned as follows. The new assignments 0 ij remain the same as ij except in the following cases: for each l with 1 l k, 0 i l ;j (l+1) (mod k) = i l ;j (l+1) (mod k) + ; 0 i l ;j l = i l ;j l ? :
Notice that a ip leaves total volumes unchanged in all classes. Also, player i l 's utility does not decrease if it holds that:
In fact, player i l 's utility strictly increases if q j l > b i l j l , whereas q j (l+1) (mod k) b i l j (l+1) (mod k) . Notice that 2-ips have already been used extensively in earlier proofs.
()). To show (a), assume to the contrary, i.e., 9i < i 9j 2 I + i n fj : q j > b i j g, in particular, j 2 I + i n I + i . Since i has incomplete utility, we know that I + i 6 = ;, and by Theorem 3.4, we know that q j = b i j . Let j 2 I + i . Now, we obtain 0 from by performing the 2-ip (i; j; i ; j ), which ensures that the individual utilities of all players except i remain unchanged and i 's utility increases by the ip value. This contradicts that is Pareto. Now (b) follows from (a) and the fact that is Nash (the conditions of Case 1 (i): (i 0 = i ). That is, j a 2 I + i . Now, we obtain 0 from by performing the 2-ip (i; j b ; i ; j a ), which, using the de nition of j a and j b , ensures that the individual utilities of all players except i remain unchanged, and i 's utility increases by the ip value. This contradicts that is Pareto.
Case 1 (ii): (i 0 6 = i ). We have j a 6 2 I + i . Pick a class j c 2 I + i . First obtain 00 using the 2-ip (i ; j c ; i 0 ; j a ), which ensures (using part (a)) that all players in 00 have the same utility as in , and therefore, 00 is Pareto if is Pareto. Now, in fact, in 00 ; it holds that j a 2 I + i , and thus the proof of Case 1 (i) can be directly employed to contradict the fact that 00 is Pareto thereby contradicting the fact that is Pareto. Case 2: (i a 6 = i b ). Consider the class j b that causes i b to be in S 2 and the class j a that causes i a to be in S 1 .
Case 2 (i): (i 0 = i ). That is, j a 2 I + i . Since there is a path from i b to i a in G, say i b = i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i k = i a , we use the de nition of the edges of G to construct a ip sequence as follows. The existence of the edges (i l ; i l+1 ) for 1 l < k implies the existence of classes j b = j 1 ; j 2 ; : : : ; j k = j a , such that the ip sequence (i b = i 1 ; j b = j 1 ; i 2 ; j 2 ; : : : ; i k = i a ; j k = j a ) has non-zero ip value. Moreover, by the de nition of the edges of G, and using the de nition of j a and j b , we obtain 0 from by performing this k-ip which ensures that the individual utilities of all players except i remain unchanged, and i 's utility increases by the ip value. This contradicts the fact that is Pareto.
Case 2 (ii): (i 0 6 = i ). A preprocessing is performed exactly like Case 1 (ii), and thereafter, the proof of Case 2 (i) is applied.
To show (d), assume to the contrary that there is a system optimum con guration M of the modi ed game as well as a service class j for which the negations of (d1), (d2), and (d3) hold: It is clear that such an allocation is always possible since the ij and b i j j satisfy the negations of (d1), (d2) and (d3) listed above. Now, because of (i), (ii) and (iii), it follows that 8j 6 = j , the amount that each player i contributes to its utility U i ( 0 ) through the class j is at least ij , and in fact the player i contributes strictly more than i j through class j . Since M was chosen so that 8i i = U i ( ), we have now exhibited a 0 which shows that is not Pareto. 
Proofs of Section 3.3
Proof of Theorem 3.13. It is su cient to show that every Nash equilibrium is system optimal with utility U( ) = P i i . The equivalence of Nash, Pareto, and system optima follows immediately. Due to the inequality in (3.14), for an assignment , each player can always unilaterally reassign its ij 's and strictly increase its own utility unless the following holds: 8i 8j : ij 6 = 0 =) q j b ij : (5.6) Thus is a Nash equilibrium (i.e., such a reassignment is impossible) only if (5.6) holds. But (5.6) is equivalent to 8i 8j : q j > b ij =) ij = 0; which, in turn, implies that is system optimal. Note that if (5.6) holds for , then clearly no player contributes to any service class where the contribution would be unutilized|i.e., every player has complete utility and thus U( ) = P i i . Hence Nash, Pareto, and system optima are all equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 3.15. To show that the process P converges to a Nash equilibrium starting from any initial con guration, notice that (1) When it is player i's turn to move, if U i < i |the player has less than full utility|then it can always unilaterally reassign its ij 's and achieve full utility. In other words, it can achieve the status described in (5.6). Otherwise, if player i has full utility, it does not move at all, i.e., it keeps its current assignment. (2) Once player i has moved, the subsequent moves of players with indices k < i will not a ect i's (full) utility. This is due to the inequality in Proposition 3.1, and because of the observation in (1): the move of such a player k does not newly cause the tra c volume q j of any service class to cross the threshold b kj b ij . Thus, once player n has moved, it achieves full utility, and subsequent moves of the other players does not a ect its utility; hence player n never moves again. In general, once players n; n ? 1; : : : ; n ? k have moved, in that order, the subsequent moves of the lower players 1; : : : ; n ? k ? 1 do not a ect the (full) utility of the higher players n; n ? 1; : : : ; n ? k, and hence they never move again. It follows that a Nash equilibrium is attained by the process P, starting from any initial assignment, as soon as the sequence of players (i.e., moves) includes the subsequence n; n ? 1; : : : ; 1.
Proofs of Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.19. We will consider both uniformity assumptions on the multidimensional QoS vectors and thresholds simultaneously. First, we consider the uniformity assumption (3.16) which states that the thresholds i r can be ordered such that the ordering is uniform over r 2 1; s]. Using this ordering and the 
